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PREGNANT? CONGRATULATIONS ... YOU'RE

FIRED! EXTENDING THE BURK PUBLIC POLICY
TORT TO PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AFTER
COLLIER V. INSIGNIA FINANCIAL GROUP?

I.

INTRODUCTION

A little over four years ago, my wife, Cheryl, and I announced to the world,
through our family and friends, that we were expecting our first child. It was truly
one of the proudest moments of our lives. Included in that list of friends was my
wife's employer. However, within a week of the "good news," she was terminated
from her employment because her boss feared that she might not return from
maternity leave. Sadly enough, thousands of expecting moms experience this
form of discrimination in the workplace each year.'
According to the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (the "EEOC"),2 pregnancy discrimination complaints increased by
twenty-three (23) percent from 1992 to 1999, 3 despite federal legislation such as
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 ("Title VII") and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (the "PDA").5 In spite of this increase, however,
1. See Diane E. Lewis, Lawsuit Sets PrecedentAgainst Misperception of Working Moms, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jun. 18, 2000, at F2, available at 2000 WL 3331205 ("3,500 [pregnancy] discrimination
complaints filed annually").
2. Established by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC promotes equal opportunity
in employment by enforcing federal statutes that prohibit employment discrimination which include:
(a) Equal Pay Act of 1963, (b) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (c) Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, (d) Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, (e) Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, (f) Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and (g) Civil
Rights Act of 1991. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 (1994).
3. Pregnancy Discrimination Charges EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1992 - FY 1999, at
The EEOC's pregnancy
http:llwww.eeoc.gov/stats/pregnanc.html (last visited Sep. 29, 2000).
discrimination table provides in pertinent part:
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
1997
1998
1999
1993
1994
1995
1996
1992
4,166
4,170
4,191
3,743
3,977
4,219
[Charge] Receipts 3,385
3,577
4. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 701, 78 Stat. 241, 255-57 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)).
Title VII, which only applies to employers with 15 or more employees, makes it unlawful "to refuse to
hire, to discharge or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment" because of sex or other protected statuses. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1).
5. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994)). The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (the "PDA") is an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994), which prohibits discrimination in the workplace on the basis of sex. See
id. The PDA provides in pertinent part:
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pregnancy discrimination complaints only comprised roughly five (5) percent of
the EEOC's total workload in 1999.6
The relatively minuscule numbers do not tell the whole story. Why?
Because most women, like my wife, have enough stress in their lives just with
being pregnant, so after being fired, they do not challenge an employer by filing a
complaint with the EEOC. Moreover, moms-to-be who work for employers with
fewer than fifteen (15) employees are not protected under Title VII. 7 Similarly,
pregnant women who work at companies with fewer than fifty (50) employees or
who have less than one (1) year on the job are not covered under the Family and
Medical Leave Act,8 which requires employers to give their employees twelve (12)
weeks of leave to care for a newborn.9 Based solely on these statutorial
requirements, it is not hard to imagine thousands of expecting moms getting fired
each year for being pregnant or while on maternity leave, and the incidents
literally go unreported.
The problem of pregnancy discrimination is further exacerbated in
Oklahoma due to the fact that Oklahoma's Anti-Discrimination Act (the
"OADA")1 0 does not protect pregnant employees of small employers" or of larger
ones who must comply with Title VII provisions. 12 While the OADA was drafted

The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to, because
of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for
all employment related purposes... as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The PDA was enacted to expressly prohibit discrimination of pregnant women
after the United States Supreme Court held that pregnancy discrimination was not prohibited by Title
VII because such discrimination differentiated between pregnant women (exclusively female) and nonpregnant persons (including members of both sexes). See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976), supersededby 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
6. Charge StatisticsFY1992-FY1999, athttp://www.eeoc.gov/stats/Charges.html. (last visited Sep.
29,2000). The EEOC's total charges table provides in pertinent part:
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Total Charges
72,302
87,942
91,189
87,529
77,990
80,680
79,591
77,444
7. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), e-2.
8. Pub. L. No. 103-3,107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (1994).).
9. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(2)(A)(i), 2611(4)(A)(i), 2612(a)(1) (1994).
10. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1101 (1991).
11. The OADA defines employer in pertinent part:
"Employer" means a person who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each
of twenty (20) or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, or a person
who as a contractor or subcontractor is furnishing the material or performing work for the
state or a governmental entity or agency of the state and includes an agent of such a person
but does not include an Indian tribe or a bona fide membership club not organized for profit.
Id. § 1301(1) (emphasis added).
12. The OADA prohibits an employer:
To fail or refuse to hire, to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate against an individual with
respect to compensation or the terms, conditions, privileges or responsibilities of
employment, because of race, color, religion,sex, national origin,age or handicap unless such
action is related to a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the employer's business or enterprise ....
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to prevent discrimination in employment and in public accommodations 13 on

grounds of "race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or handicap' ' 14 under
specified conditions, discrimination based on pregnancy is not prohibited.' 5 To
'6
cure this deficiency in the OADA, many victims may argue that "public policy'
prohibits an employer from terminating a pregnant woman regardless of the longstanding effect of the employment-at-will rule. 7
This note will analyze the recent Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in
Collier v. Insignia Financial Groupis regarding the applicability of the Burk"9

public policy tort to victims of pregnancy discrimination. Section II is a brief
history of the Burk exception as it applies to an employment-at-will contract.
Section III follows with a statement of the Collier case. Section IV discusses
Oklahoma law relating to the Burk exception prior to the Collier decision.
Section V reveals the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Collier, while
Section VI discusses the court's reasoning and analysis. Section VII offers a
conclusory opinion that the Collier court never intended that a victim of
pregnancy discrimination, who has been discharged from employment, would be
able to maintain a public policy tort claim under the Burk exception to the
common law's employment-at-will rule. Finally, Section VIII will conclude the
analysis.

Md § 1302(A)(1) (emphasis added). Pregnancy is not included in this list, and this status is not
equivalent to sex. See supra note 4.
13. See id. §§ 1101 et seq..
14. Id. § 1302(A)(1).
15. There is not a single case under Oklahoma law which purports that pregnancy discrimination is
prohibited under the OADA. See also supra note 5.
16. See Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549,552-53 (Okla. 1987). The Hinson case states:
An at-will employee's discharge has been declared to be actionable on several public policy
grounds. Claims recognized under this rubric are those by employees dismissed for (a)
refusing to participate in an illegal activity; (b) performing an important public obligation;
(c) exercising a legal right or interest; (d) exposing some wrongdoing by his employer; and
(e) performing an act that public policy would encourage or, for refusing to do something
that public policy would condemn, when the discharge is coupled with a showing of bad
faith, malice or retaliation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
17. See id. at 552 ("Under the American common-law rule, when the length of the master/servant
relationship is unspecified by contract, either the employer or employee can terminate the employment
without liability."); Pierce v. Franklin Elect. Co., 737 P.2d 921, 923 n.4 (Okla. 1987) ("Oklahoma case
law continues to recognize that an at-will employee is subject to termination for any reason or without
cause."); Foster v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 6 P.2d 805,808 (Okla. 1932) ("Our court has announced the rule
that a contract which is indefinite as to duration is a contract at will and may be terminated by either
party at any time.").
18. 981 P.2d 321 (Okla. 1999).
19. See Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 28 (Okla. 1989), affd, 956 F.2d 213 (10th Cir. 1991)
(recognizing a tort, commonly known as the Burk public policy tort, which prohibits an at-will
termination of an employee when "the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy as
articulated by constitutional, statutory or decisional law").

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2000

3

Tulsa Law
Review,
Vol. 36 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 8
TULSA
LAW
JOURNAL
[Vol.

II.

A.

36:677

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BURK PUBLIC POLICY TORT
EXCEPTION

The Employment-at-will Rule

Since the late nineteenth century, an employee's ability to keep his or her
job has traditionally been subject to the employment-at-will rule. 20 Under the atwill rule, an employer'may terminate an employee for any reason, good or bad,
unless there is an employment contract for a definite period of time. 2'
During the past three decades, many jurisdictions 22 have become dissatisfied
with the rigidity of this rule? The Illinois Supreme Court exemplified this
discontentment by noting:
With the rise of large corporations conducting specialized operations and employing
relatively immobile workers who often have no other place to market their skills,
recognition that the employer and employee do not stand on equal footing is
realistic. In addition, unchecked employer power, like unchecked employee power,
has been seen to present a distinct threat to the public policy carefully considered
and adopted by society as a whole. As a result, it is now recognized that a proper
balance must be maintained among the employer's interest in operating a business
efficiently and profitably, the employee's
interest
in24earning a livelihood, and
.
..
.
society's interest in seeing its public policies carried out.

To circumvent the employment-at-will rule, many jurisdictions 5 began to
20. See Gary E. Murg & Clifford Scharman, Employment at Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the
Rule?, 23 B.C. L. REV. 329,333-35 (1982) [hereinafter Murg].
21. See Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884), overruled on othergrounds
by Hutton v. Waters, 179 S.W. 134, 137-38 (Tenn. 1915). The court stated:
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they please, and to discharge
or retain employees at will for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause without
thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. It is a right which an employee may exercise
in the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause or want of cause as the employer.
Id.
22. See infra note 25.
23. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025,1031 (Ariz. 1985), overruled by Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 23-1501 (1996).
24. Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981) (citation omitted).
25. For decisions that used the public policy tort theory see infra note 35.
For decisions that used the implied contract theory see Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So.2d
725 (Ala. 1987); Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983); Leikvold
v. Valley View Comm. Hosp., 688 P.2d 170 (Ariz. 1984); Gladden v. Ark. Children's Hosp., 728 S.W.2d
501 (Ark. 1987); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981), overruled in part by
Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000); Salimi v. Farmers Ins. Group, 684 P.2d 264 (Col. Ct.
App. 1984); Finley v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 520 A.2d 208 (Conn. 1987), overruled by Curry v. Bums,
626 A.2d 719 (1993); Bason v. Am. Univ., 414 A.2d 522 (D.C. 1980); Kinoshita v. Canadian Pac.
Airlines, 724 P.2d 110 (Haw. 1986); Watson v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hosps., Inc., 720 P.2d 632 (Idaho
1986); Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314 (Ill. 1987); McBride v. City of
Sioux City, 444 N.W.2d 85 (Iowa 1989); Allegri v. Providence-St. Margaret Health Ctr., 684 P.2d 1031
(Kan. Ct. App. 1984); Shah v. Am. Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1983); Larrabee v.
Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97 (Me. 1984); Staggs v. Blue Cross, Inc., 486 A.2d 798 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1985); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980); Pine River
State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Robinson v. Bd. of Trs. of E. Cent. Junior Coll.,
477 So.2d 1352 (Miss. 1985); Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. 1983); Morris v. Lutheran
Med. Ctr., 340 N.W.2d 388 (Neb. 1983); Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 668 P.2d 261 (Nev. 1983);
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carve out exceptions using three distinct theories: (1) public policy tort; (2)
implied contract that restricts the employer's power to terminate; and (3) breach

of implied covenant of "good faith and fair dealing., 26 The most widely-accepted
exception is the public policy tort,27 which provides the employee with28a cause of
action when his or her discharge is contrary to a notion of public policy.
B.

Peterman

The District Court of Appeals of California was the first court2 9 to
circumvent the absolutist formulation of the employment-at-wiU rule and to lay
down the initial foundation for the public policy exception in Petermann v.
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396.30 In Petermann,an employer
fired an employee after he refused to commit perjury, as per his employer's
instructions, while testifying before a subcommittee of the California legislature
during an investigation of his union.31 Since false testimony of any kind directly
impedes the judicial process, the court found that the perjury statutes served an
essential public policy function.3 2 The court reasoned that
[i]t would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy and

sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee, whether the
employment be for a designated or unspecified duration, on the ground that
the
33

employee declined to commit perjury, an act specifically enjoined by statute.

Based on this finding, the court determined that the employer's act was
Panto v. Moore Bus. Forms, 547 A.2d 260 (N.H. 1988); Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d
1257 (N.J. 1985); Forrester v. Parker, 606 P.2d 191 (N.M. 1980); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, 443 N.E.2d
441 (N.Y. 1982); Hammond v. N.D. State Pers. Bd., 345 N.W.2d 359 (N.D. 1984); Mers v. Dispatch
Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150 (Ohio 1985); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976);
Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publ'g Co., 576 P.2d 356 (Or. 1978); Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 357
S.E.2d 452 (S.C. 1987); Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D. 1983); Hamby v.
Genesco, Inc., 627 S.W.2d 373 (Term. 1981); Piactelli v. Southern Utah State Coll., 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah
1981); Benoir v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 514 A.2d 716 (Vt. 1986); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d
1081 (Wash. 1984); Cook v. Heck's Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1986); Ferraro v. Koelsch, 368 N.W.2d
666 (Wis. 1985); Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985).
For decisions that used the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing theory see Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So.2d 725 (Ala. 1987); Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983);
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985), overruled by Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 231501 et seq. (1996); Cleary v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980), overruledin part
by Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352 (Cal. 2000); Merrill v. Crothall-Am., Inc., 606 A.2d
96 (Del. 1992); Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas. Co., 778 P.2d 744 (Idaho 1989); Fortune v. Nat'l Cash
Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont.
1982); K-Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549
(N.H. 1974); Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989); Wilder v. Cody Country
Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211 (,Vyo. 1994).
26. Wagenseller,710 P.2d at 1031.
27. See Kenneth T. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A Quadrennial
Assessment of the Labor Law Issue of the 80s, 40 BuS. LAW. 1, 6 (1984).
28. See Murg, supranote 20, at 343-44.
29. See David J. Walsh & Joshua L. Schwarz, State Common Law Wrongful Discharge Doctrines:
Up-date, Refinement, and Rationales,33 AM. Bus. L.J. 645, 657 (1996).
30. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
31. See id. at 26.
3Z See id.at 27.
33. Id.
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tortuous, and therefore, it granted the employee a cause of action to remedy the

situation.34
Since Petermann,judiciaries from virtually every state, including Oklahoma,
have adopted some form of the public policy exception to alter the long-standing
presumption of the employment-at-will rule. 35
C.

Hinson

The Oklahoma Supreme Court formally addressed the public policy
exception for the first time in 1987. 36 In Hinson v. Cameron,37 an employee,
working as a nurse's assistant, was fired for allegedly "not following orders."38
The employee claimed that she never received the order for which she was
discharged and that her supervisor had "altered the assignment sheet. 3 9 On
34. See id.
35. At the time of this publication, the vast majority of states acknowledge some form of the public
policy exception to the employment-at-will rule. See Knight v. Am. Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788,
792 (Alaska 1986); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380,381 (Ark. 1988); Petermann,344 P.2d
at 27; Cronk v. Int'l Rural Elec. Ass'n, 765 P.2d 619, 622 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Sheets v. Teddy's
Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 386-87, 389 (Conn. 1980); Heller v. Dover Warehouse Mkt., Inc.,
515 A.2d 178,-181 (Del. 1986); Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C. 1991);
Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 629-32 (Haw. 1982); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation
Dist., 563 P.2d 54,57 (Idaho 1977); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353,358 (Ill. 1978); Frampton
v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425,427-28 (Ind. 1973); Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d
558 (Iowa 1988); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs., 630 P.2d 186 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1981); Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730,733-34 (Ky. 1983); MacDonald
v. E. Fine Paper, Inc., 485 A.2d 228,230 (Me. 1984); Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 473
(Md.1981); De Rose v. Putnam Mgmt. Corp., 496 N.E.2d 428,431 (Mass. 1986); Sventko v. Kroger Co.,
245 N.W.2d 151, 153-54 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569,57071 (Minn. 1987); McAr v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So.2d 603, 607 (Miss. 1993); Boyle v. Vista
Eye Wear., Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 877 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127, 129
(Mont. 1980); Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square Ltd., 416 N.W.2d 510, 515 (Neb. 1987); Wiltsie v. Baby
Grand Corp., 774 P.2d 432,433 (Nev. 1989); Short v. Sch. Admin. Unit No. 16,612 A.2d 364,370 (N.H.
1992); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm., 417 A.2d 505,512 (N.J. 1980); Chavez v. Manville Prod. Corp., 777 P.2d
371,375 (N.M. 1989); Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 416 S.E.2d 166,173 (N.C. 1992); Krein v. Marian
Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793,794-95 (N.D. 1987); Painter v. Graley, 696 N.E.2d 51,56 (Ohio
1994); Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24,28 (Okla. 1989); Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 681 P.2d
114, 116-18 (Or. 1984); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc. 386 A.2d 119, 120 (Pa. 1978); Ludwick v.
This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213, 216 (S.C. 1985); Johnson v. Kreiser's, Inc., 433 N.W.2d
225, 227-28 (S.D. 1988); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Tenn. 1984); Sabine Pilot
Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733,735 (Tex. 1985); Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033,1042
(Utah 1989); Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 589 (Vt. 1986); Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville,
331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (Va. 1985); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984);
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270,275-76 (W. Va. 1978); Wandry v. Bull's Eye Credit Union,
384 N.W.2d 325,326 (Wis. 1986); Griess v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 776 P.2d 752,754 (Wyo. 1989).
Currently, courts in six states (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, and Rhode Island)
have rejected any exception to the employment-at-will rule. See Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352
So.2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977); Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc. 476 So.2d 1327, 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); Goodroe v. Ga. Power Co., 251 S.E.2d 51, 52 (Ga. 1978); Gil v. Metal Serv. Corp., 412
So.2d 706, 708 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90 (N.Y.
1983), rev'd in part by Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 527 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988);
Pacheco v. Raytheon Co., 623 A.2d 464,465 (R.I. 1993).
In addition to the common law recognition of the public policy exception to the employment-at-will
rule, Montana has codified the exception by statute. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (1993).
36. See Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1987).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 551.
39. Id.
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certiorari, the employer asked the court to determine whether "an at-will
employee, dismissed for her failure to perform an assigned duty, [maintained] a
cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge from employment., 40 Given these
facts, the court quickly dismissed any possibility of applying the public policy
exception because the employee's "termination was not in direct violation of any
public policy. ' 41 In effect, the employer never ordered "Hinson to perform an
illegal act or denied her an opportunity to exercise her legal rights[,]... [and]
[s]he was not prevented from performing an important public obligation nor was
her termination occasioned by articulated concerns for the Hospital's legal or
ethical misconduct." 42
D.

Burk

In 1989, however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court tackled the public policy
exception in Burk v. K-Mart Corp..4 In Burk, an employee alleged constructive
discharge after being harassed for reporting the wrongdoings of several K-Mart
employees. 44 The employee declared that as a result of her whistleblowing her
employer refused to promote her based on her sex.45 The employee asserted a
cause of action in contract and in tort for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing relating to her employment contract. 46 In response to these
claims, the employer "denied the purported existence of a claim in tort for a
breach of an implied covenant of good faith, and also asserted the contract action
did not exist because the employee's termination resulted in no violation of the
employee's constitutional rights." 47
To resolve the dispute, the federal district court certified the following six
questions of law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court:
1. In Oklahoma, is there an implied obligation of good faith and fair
dealing in reference to termination in every employment-at-will contract?
2. Is the implied obligation of good faith mutual between the employer
and employee?
3. Does the breach of such implied obligation, assuming there is one,
sound in contract and/or tort?
4. If the answer to question No. 3 is "contract," what are the recoverable
damages for breach of the implied covenant?
5. If the answer to question No. 3 is "tort," what is the character of
defendant's conduct that would permit recovery of punitive damages?

40. Id.

41. Id. at 553.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Hinson, 742 P.2d at 553.
770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989), affd, 956 F.2d 213 (10th Cir. 1991).
See id. at 25.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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6. Whether the answer to question No. 3 is tort or contract, or both,
48 what
is the extent of the duty, if any, of either party to mitigate damages?
After the Oklahoma Supreme Court immediately "reject[ed] the implication
of an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in every employment-at-will
contract,, 49 the court refused to answer the five remaining questions.50 However,
silence did not ensue.
While ever-mindful of the premise that an employee-at-will contract may be
terminated at any time for any reason, good or bad, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
acknowledged that the at-will rule was "not absolute.., and the interests of the
people of Oklahoma are not best served by a marketplace of cut-throat business
dealings where the law of the jungle is thinly clad in contractual lace." 51 To define
the boundaries of when the at-will rule could be skirted, the court first clarified its
holding in Hall v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,52 which many previously
"perceived as creating a new cause of action in favor of an at-will employee
discharged in bad faith." 53 Although the court in Hall recognized an implied
covenant of good faith when an agency relationship existed, the court in Burk
unequivocally declined to recognize an action in contract or tort for the breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 54 Instead, the court decided to
"follow the modem trend and adopt... the public policy exception to the at-will
termination rule in a narrow class of cases in which the discharge is contrary to a
clear mandate 55of public policy as articulated by constitutional, statutory or
decisional law.
To lay the foundation for the public policy exception in Oklahoma, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court started with the premise that "a tort may arise in the
course of the performance of a contract and that tort [law] may then be the basis
for recovery even though it is the contract that creates the relationship between
the parties., 56 Therefore, the court determined that if an at-will employee's
discharge violates public policy, the termination is considered a "tortious breach
of contractual obligations. 57
In order to define the term public policy, the court referred back to Hinson,
where the court had previously highlighted several nationally accepted
violations. 58 Recognizing the vagueness associated with this new exception to the
at-will rule, the court further stated:

48. Id. at 25.
49. Burk, 770 P.2d at 25.
50. See id.
51. See Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027,1029 (Okla. 1985).
52. Id
53. Burk, 770 P.2d at 27.
54. See id at 26-27.
55. Id. at 28.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id.at 28-29; see also supra note 16 (listing the nationally recognized public policy exceptions
mentioned in Hinson).
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In determining whether a clear mandate of public policy is violated, courts should
inquire whether the employer's conduct contravenes the letter or purpose of a
constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision or scheme. Prior judicial decisions
may also establish the relevant public policy. However, courts should proceed
cautiously if called upon to declare public policy absent some prior legislative or
judicial expression on the subject.59
Thus, the court determined that "an actionable tort claim under Oklahoma
law is where an employee is discharged for refusing to act in violation of an
established and well-defined public policy or for performing an act consistent with
'
a clear and compelling public policy. ' W
In Burk, the Oklahoma Supreme Court severed the employer's longstanding right to determine the size and composition of his or her workforce
without incurring liability under the employment-at-will rule.61 By design, the
public policy tort recognized by the Burk court now protects certain employee
activities regarded as matters of public policy.62 The policy underlying the Burk
opinion is very clear and simple - greater job security for private sector
employees. 63 This new,form of protection under the aegis of tort law, however, is
limited; it only protects employees discharged for bad cause. Thus, the public
policy exception stops short of mandating private sector employers to show good
cause prior to discharging an employee.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Relevant Facts

In 1994, 64 Jill Collier began working at Insignia Commercial Group, Inc.
("Insignia") as a leasing agent.65 While holding this position, Ms. Collier's primary
responsibility was marketing properties to potential clients "by cold calling, direct
mailing and [by utilizing her] previous contacts." 66 Ms. Collier specialized in

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Burk, 770 P.2d at 29 (quoting Parnar v. Am. Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982)).
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. Describing the effect of the public policy tort, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated:
Employee job security interests are safeguarded against employer actions that undermine
fundamental policy preferences. Employers retain sufficient flexibility to make needed
personnel decisions in order to adapt to changing economic conditions. Society also benefits
from our holding in a number of ways. A more stable job market is achieved. Wellestablished public policies are advanced. Finally, the public is protected against frivolous
lawsuits since courts will be able to screen cases on motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim or for summary judgment if the discharged employee cannot allege a clear expression
of public policy.
Id. (quoting Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (Wis. 1983)).
64. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, App. D at 1, Collier
v. Insignia Fin. Group, No. CIV-97-1142-R (W.D. Okla. Jan. 19,2000) [hereinafter Collier'sResponse].
65. See id. at
8,23.
66. Id. at 7.
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listing exclusive "office, retail, warehouse and land sites." 67
Shortly after her employment began with Insignia, Ms. Collier observed that
her "male supervisors('... rewarded female employees who dated them, [who]
had drinks after work and/or [who] 'partied' with them. '69 The "[r]ewards
included: 1) job security; 2) promotions; 3) pay raises; [and] 4) pleasant behavior
on behalf of the male coworkers and supervisors toward the females., 70 In
contrast, Ms. Collier also witnessed that female employees 71 who refused to date
or socially interact with these supervisors were subjected to a hostile work
environment involving verbal abuse, sexual harassment, lack of promotion, and
interference with assigned job-related duties.72 Female employees who did not
quit as a result of the hostile work environment were often fired by their Insignia
supervisors. 73
When Ms. Collier failed to accept the social invitations extended from her
supervisors, 74 she too was subjected to the various forms of hostility described
above. 75 From the start of Ms. Collier's employment, Mr. Gennarelli, the
Regional Leasing Director, repeatedly "yelled and cussed at [Ms. Collier] using
the word 'fuck' every other month." 76 In addition to his verbal assaults, in
December 1995, Mr. Gennarelli "directed [Ms. Collier] to flirt with a client.., in
order to keep the account." Together with Mr. Barthlow and Mr. Collins, Mr.
Gennarelli frequently withheld information from Ms. Collier and a female cobroker in order
to intercept leasing deals and, subsequently, to receive the
78
commissions.

During weekly mandatory meetings from November 1995 to September
1996, Mr. Barthlow and Mr. Collins "discussed their sex lives, told dirty jokes and
[frequently] talked about a pornographic movie 7 9 in Ms. Collier's presence.
Although Ms. Collier verbally complained to Ms. Risk, Senior Property Manager,

67. Id.
68. Those serving as supervisors over Ms. Collier during her employment at Insignia were: Mr.
Darin Barthlow, Vice-President of Leasing; Mr. Louis Gennarelli, Regional Leasing Director; Mr.
George O'Connor, Retail Leasing Director; Mr. Scott Collins, Senior Leasing Manager; Ms. Dee Ann
Ellis, Director of Property Management; and Mr. Greg Banta, Leasing Manager. Id. at 6.
69. Id. at J 9.
70. Collier'sResponse, at 9.
71. Id. Ms. Collier indicated that the following women never dated or socially interacted with their
supervisors: Ms. Dee Ann Ellis, Director of Property Management; Ms. Heidi Hope-Vanlandingham,
Leasing Specialist; Ms. Kathy White, Leasing Secretary; Ms. Kathy Risk, Leasing Secretary; Ms. Tiffani
Dodson, Leasing Secretary; Ms. Stephanie Worley, Secretary; and Ms. Julie Cunningham, Temporary
Secretary. See iL at 13. In retaliation for refusing to accept the social invitations of their supervisor,
these women were subjected to verbal abuse, sexual harassment, gender discrimination, lack of
promotion or termination. See iL at 14-18.
72 Id at 13.
73. See id at 13, 16, 18.
74. See idat 13.
75. Collier'sResponse, at %%19-36.
76. Id. at 19.
77. Id. at 128.
78. See id. at 20. Unlike the male leasing agents, Insignia also required Ms. Collier to "co-broker
many of [her] listings" thereby reducing the amount of her commission. Id. at 123.
79. Collier'sResponse, at 136.
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no corrective action ever transpired, and the vulgar comments continued8s In
January 1996, Mr. Barthlow actually "placed his hand on [Ms. Collier's] shoulder
and asked her if his behavior was sexually harassing." 81 Mr. Barthlow's
inappropriate conduct continued in March 1996 when he asked Ms. Collier, "[a]re
those your boobs? '' 2 Once again, Ms. Collier complained to Ms. Risk, and no
corrective action was taken.u3
Next, Mr. Banta propositioned Ms. Collier, in June 1996, by saying that "he
would do anything for [Ms. Collier] in exchange for sex with him."e Ms. Collier
complained about the incident, but the incident ended without corrective action. 8,
To make matters worse, Mr. Banta informed Ms. Collier, "in July and August of
1996, that [Mr.] Gennarelli told him he would fire [Ms. Collier] if [she] made any
more complaints of discrimination." 6 Empowered by Mr. Gennarelli's threat, Mr.
Banta continued his sexual innuendoes. In August of 1996, he "referred to his
penis as a 'lilly dilly' in [Ms. Collier's] presence." 87 Three days later, Mr. Banta
stalked Ms. Collier "in the office parking lot in his car and lewdly whistled at [her]
as [she] walked towards the office. ' '8s
In light of her complaining about the inappropriate and unwelcome conduct
described above, Ms. Collier's supervisors retaliated by delaying payment of her
commissions between February 1995 through July 1996.89 Once again, Ms. Collier
formally complained and voiced9 her grievances to her co-workers as well as to
those with supervisory authority. 0
In August of 1996, however, Insignia promoted Ms. Collier to the position of
Leasing Manager, although her salary still remained less than the other male
leasing managers. 91 Additionally, Ms. Collier got a new supervisor, Mr. George
O'Connor, who personally voiced Ms. Collier's complaints of gender
discrimination and sexual harassment to Mr. Gennarelli. 92 After Mr. Gennarelli
declared that he would not take corrective action, Mr. O'Connor dropped the
matter completely. 93 As a result, Ms. Collier drafted a letter to Mr. Henry
Horowitz, President of Insignia, describing her gender discrimination and "unfair
pay practices regarding [her] commissions.' 94 Just like the others, Mr. Horowitz

80. See id.
81. Id. at 29.
82. Id. at 30.
83. See id
84. Id. at 131.
85. See Collier,at g731.
86. Id. at 42.
87. Id. at 1 33.
88. Collier'sResponse, at 34.
89. See id.
at 121.
90. See id.
91. See id.
at 24; Jill Collier's Complaint at 5, Collier v. Insignia Fin. Group, No. CIV-97-1142-R
(W.D. Okla. Jul. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Collier'sComplaint].
92. Collier'sResponse, at 91
37.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 91
38.
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did not respond and no corrective action was implemented. 95
During August 1996, Ms. Collier elected to file a gender discrimination and
sexual harassment complaint with the EEOC.96 Despite her formal complaint,
Insignia took no corrective action. 97 Due to Insignia's failure to respond to her
consistent complaints of inappropriate and unwelcome conduct, Ms. Collier left
Insignia in September of 1996 because of the hostile work environment. 9 Seven
months after her constructive termination, the EEOC issued a "right-to-sue
letter," 99 and Ms. Collier filed a complaint against Insignia in the Western District
of Oklahoma.ca This note discusses Count II of Ms. Collier's complaint in which
she alleged that Insignia violated the gender discrimination provisions of the
OADA and Oklahoma public policy. 10'

B.

Issue

As the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated, "[t]he submitted query's essence is
whether quid pro quo sexual harassment which culminates in an employee's
'constructive discharge' is actionable under an exception - first enunciated in
Burk v. K-Mart Corp.... - to the common law's employment-at-will doctrine."''

2

IV. OKLAHOMA LAW IN REGARDS TO THE BURK EXCEPTION
PRIOR TO THE CASE
A.

Tate

The Oklahoma Supreme Court first expanded the "tightly circumscribed"'' 3
boundaries of the Burk public policy tort exception in 1992.' 4 In Tate v.
Browning-Ferris, Inc.,10 5 a black male employee filed two complaints with the
EEOC for racial discrimination and retaliatory discharge.' 6 After the EEOC
failed to resolve the matter, the employee filed a lawsuit in federal court asserting
federal and state claims, alleging that the employer's conduct violated Title VII 0 7
and Oklahoma public policy.1°
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See id.
See id. at 40. See also Collier's Complaint, at 7.
See Collier'sResponse, at 40.
See id.

Collier'sComplaint, at 7.
See id.
See id. at H 11-12.

102. Collier v. Insignia Fin. Group, 981 P.2d 321, 323 (Okla. 1999).
103. Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24,29 (Okla. 1989), affd, 956 F.2d 213 (10th Cir. 1991).

104. See Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc. 833 P.2d 1218 (Okla. 1992).
105. See id.

106. See id. at 1220-21.
107. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 701, 78 Stat. 241, 255-57 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)).
Title VII, which only applies to employers with 15 or more employees, makes it unlawful "to refuse to
hire, to discharge or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her]

compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment" because of sex or other protected
statuses. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
108. See Tate, 833 P.2d at 1221.
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In this case, the Tate court held that a "racially motivated discharge or one in
retaliation for filing a racial discrimination complaint"'1 9 constituted a violation of
public policy under Burk. 10 Additionally, the court determined that neither the
federal nor the state statutes governing racial discrimination were exclusive... and,
therefore, enabled a wrongfully-discharged employee to assert the Burk public
At the time of Tate,"3 however, the OADA did not
policy tort exception.
provide a separate cause of action to a racially-discriminated employee who was
not satisfied with the outcome of his administrative proceeding, while affording
such a remedy to an employee alleging handicap-discrimination.11 4 While the
court acknowledged the two distinct remedies under the OADA, the Tate court
did not express an opinion on the consequences of such a difference. 5 Rather,
the court declared that "discrimination victims [under the OADA] comprise a
single class."116 Since the OADA prohibited a racially-discriminated employee

from recovering money damages for wrongful discharge, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court extended the Burk public policy tort exception to provide the employee
with an adequate remedy under Oklahoma law. 7

109. Id. at 1225.
110. Id.
111. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1101 (1991). That section states that "[t]he general purposes of [the
OADA] are to provide for execution within the state of the policies embodied in the federal Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and Section 504 of the
federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ..... Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Tate, 833 P.2d at 1227 n.40
(stating that "Title VII is not exclusive");id, at 1229 ("There is nothing in the [OADA] to indicate a
legislative intent to even enter, much less completely occupy, the entire arena of legally regulated
employer/employee relationship.").
112. See Tate, 833 P.2d at 1227-31.
113. See id. at 1223. Under the law as it existed, neither Title VII nor the OADA provided an
employee the right to a jury trial or compensatory or punitive damages. The Tate court indicated in
footnote #12 that "[t]he Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Pub. Law 102-166 [S.1745]; [effective] Nov. 21,1991)
amend[ed] the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to strengthen and improve federal civil rights law. Id. at 1223
n.12. The amendment provide[d], among other changes, for jury trials and for compensatory as well as
punitive damages for employment discrimination." lId
114. See id. at 1227 n.38 ("In the [OADA] 1990 revision a private cause of action was added only for
those aggrieved by handicap discrimination."); Id. at 1229 (stating the OADA "here in contest does
not provides a private right of action to a person aggrieved by racially discriminatory practices[;]...
[i]n contrast, it does... for discrimination based on handicap"). When Tate was decided, title 21,
section 1901A of the Oklahoma Statutes provided in pertinent part:
If a charge for discrimination in employment on the basis of handicap is filed under the
provisions of Sections 1101 through 1801 of Title 25 of the Oklahoma Statutes and is not
resolved to the satisfaction of the charging party within one hundred eighty (180) days from
the filing of such charge, the charging party may commence an action for redress against any
person who is alleged to have discriminated against the charging party and against any
person named as respondent in the charge, such action to be commenced in the district court
of this state for the county in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have
been committed.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1901(A). This section further provides a handicap-discriminated employee the
right to a jury trial, "nominal or actual damages such as reinstatement or hiring, with or without back
pay, or any other legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate," and reasonable attorney
fees to the prevailing party. Id. at § 1901(B)-(D).
115. See Tate, 833 P.2d at 1229.
116. Id. at 1229-30.
117. See id. at 1230.
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Groce

A few years after Tate, the Oklahoma Supreme Court widened the narrow
boundaries of Burk just a little more in Groce v. Foster.118 In this case, an
employee filed a third-party claim to recover money damages for injuries he
received due to the alleged negligence of an oil drilling company "which was not
only a service contractor at the jobsite, but also his employer's customer." 119 Once
informed of the lawsuit, the employer demanded the employee 21to drop the
complaint immediately. 1'2 When the employee refused, he was fired.1
In a 5-4 opinion, the Groce court held that retaliatory discharge of an
employee who refuses to dismiss a "§ 44 lawsuit l 22 against a third party to redress
an on-the-job injury impermissibly interferes" 1 3 with the public policy articulated
in the Workers' Compensation Act (the "WCA").124 The court derived its
1
conclusion by holistically considering the public policy expressed in the WCA,
found in title 85, sections 5-7, 12, 44-47 and 84 of the Oklahoma Statutes.16 In light
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

880 P.2d 902 (Okla. 1994).
Id at 904.
See id.
See id
See OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 44(a) (1989). Section 44(a) states in pertinent part:
If a worker entitled to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act is injured or
killed by the negligence or wrong of another not in the same employ, such injured worker
shall, before any suit or claim under the Workers' Compensation Act, elect whether to take
compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act, or to pursue his remedy against such
other.

IL
123. Groce, 880 P.2d at 905.
124. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 1 (1989).
125. See Groce, 880 P.2d at 907.
126. To review the pertinent terms of Section 44, see supra note 122. The pertinent terms of title 85,
section 5 are: "[n]o person, firm, partnership or corporation may discharge any employee because the
employee has in good faith filed a claim, or has retained a lawyer to represent him in said claim ...
OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 5 (1989).
The pertinent terms of title 85, section 6 are: "a person, firm, partnership or corporation who violates
any provision of Section 5... shall be liable for reasonable damages, actual and punitive if applicable,
suffered by an employee as a result of the violation." Id. § 6.
The pertinent terms of title 85, section 7 are: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided for by law, the district
courts of the state shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown, to retain violations of this act [Workers'
Compensation Act]." Id. § 7.
The pertinent terms of title 85, section 12 are:
The liability prescribed in Section 11 of this title shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liability of the employer and any of his employees .... at common law or otherwise, for such
injury, loss of services, or death, to the employee, or the spouse, personal representative,
parents, or dependents of the employee, or any other person. If an employer has failed to
secure the payment of compensation for his injured employee .... [the] injured employee...
may maintain an action in the courts for damages on account of such injury ....
Id. § 12.
The pertinent terms of title 85, section 45 are: "[n]o benefits, savings or insurance of the injured
employee, independent of the provisions of this act [Workers' Compensation Act] shall be considered
in determining the compensation or benefit to be paid under this act." Id. § 45.
The pertinent terms of title 85, section 46 are:
No agreement by any employee to pay any portion of the premium paid by his employer to
the cost of mutual insurance or other insurance, maintained for or carried for the purpose of
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of each of these sections, the Groce court recognized that when the employer fired
the employee for "pursuing his legal action to redress an on-the-job injury against
a third party[,]"' 27 it violated a public policy found in the WCA.
C.

List

In light of the improvements to the federal civil rights law in 1991 ,'1 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to expand the Burk public policy tort
exception in List v. Anchor PaintManufacturing Co.12 9 In List, a fifty-seven-yearold employee with over thirty years of experience working for Anchor Paint was
demoted from a supervisory position and replaced by a younger employee.130 As a
result of a cut in pay, the loss of his supervisory/decision-making authority, and an
increase in physical labor associated with his new position, the fifty-seven-year-old
employee quit.131 When the employee pursued a lawsuit, the employee's wife,
who also worked at Anchor Paint, was suspended indefinitely and without pay
three months later. 32 In the joint lawsuit, both employees claimed violations of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967133 (the "ADEA"), the
OADA, and Oklahoma public policy. 34
During the trial, the federal district court asked the Oklahoma Supreme
Court to decide whether Oklahoma law "recognizes a tort claim for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy based on constructive discharge."' 135 To
settle the issue at hand, the List court relied heavily on its decision in Tate. 36 The
distinction,' 37 however, was clear; in Tate, the employee lacked the remedies
currently available to Mr. List under the ADEA.1 r 8

providing compensation as herein required, shall be valid, and any employer who makes a
deduction for such purpose from the wages or salary of any employee entitled to the benefits
of this act [Workers' Compensation Act] shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

Id. § 46. The pertinent terms of title 85, section 47 are: "[n]o agreement by an employee to waive his
right to compensation under this act [Workers' Compensation Act] (footnote omitted) shall be valid."
Id. § 47.
The pertinent terms of title 85, section 84 are:
The power and jurisdiction of the [Workers' Compensation] Court over each case shall be
continuing and it may.. .make such modifications or changes with respect to former findings
or orders relating thereto if, in its opinion, it may be justified, including the right to require
physical examinations.. .and subject to the same penalties for refusal.
Id. § 84.
127. Groce, 880 P.2d at 907.
128. See infra note 221.
129. 910 P.2d 1011, 1015 (Okla. 1996).
130. See id. at 1013.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (2000) (prohibiting employment discrimination of employees that are

40-years-old or older).
134. See List, 910 P.2d at 1013.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 1013-14.
137. See id. at 1014.
138. See id. at 1013-14.
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In light of these- federal remedies,139 the List court did "not extend the
narrow Burk exception."' 14 Rather, the court specifically focused on one purpose
listed in the OADA which states the following in pertinent part: "The general
purposes of this act are to provide for execution within the state of the policies
embodied in ... the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ... to

make uniform the law of those states which enact this act .... 141
Accordingly, the court interpreted the purpose of the OADA in concert with
the ADEA to determine what the statutory remedies for age discrimination were
under state law.142 Additionally, the court asserted that the "type of
discrimination involved... [is] an important factor in courts deciding whether
they will hold that statutory remedies preempt common law remedies." 143 Since
the employee's claim was "not based on retaliation for anything that he did...
[but rather] solely upon his status, his age ' 144 and since adequate federal remedies
existed, the List court held that the employee's statutory remedies under the
ADEA were exclusive. 45

D. Marshall
The last significant case of first impression regarding the Burk public policy
tort prior to Collier was Marshall v. OK Rental & Leasing, Inc.' 46 In this case, a
female employee quit her job after a co-worker repeatedly subjected her to
unwelcome, sexually-related propositions and passes. 147 After the co-worker
continually asked her to go out on dates, the employee informed her supervisor,
"hop[ing] that the supervisor would say something to [the co-worker] about it, but
apparently the supervisor said nothing."' 4 Additionally, the employee's diary
reflected that the co-worker attempted to kiss her on several different occasions
and that "her complaints were getting nowhere.' ' 149 The only reported time that a
supervisor ever reprimanded the co-worker occurred after hearing him offer to
switch work days with the female employee "in exchange for sex."150 Since the coworker's conduct continued in light of her complaints, the employee elected not to
return from vacation.' 5'
Alleging that Dollar Rent a Car "allowed on-the-job sexual harassment by a
139. See i at 1014.
140. List, 910 P.2d at 1014.
141. Id. (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1101(A) (1991)).
142. See id.
143. Id. at 1014. The List court made its decision after it referenced Pre-emption of Wrongful
Discharge Cause of Action by Civil Rights Laws, 21 A.L.R. 5th 1, 25 § 3[a] (1994), and identified
"eleven state holding[s] that [prohibited] employees ... [from] bring[ing] common law actions for age
discrimination." Id. at 1014 n.4.
144. Id. at 1015.
145. See id.
146. 939 P.2d 1116 (Okla. 1997).
147. See id. at 1118.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id.
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co-worker,, 152 the employee filed a claimed in federal court asserting the Burk
public policy tort exception.153 The employee declared that the OADA coupled
with Title VII created the public policy "upon which she [could] base a Burk
wrongful discharge claim." 154 Relying heavily on List, 55 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court disagreed, finding that the female employee's "claim [was] based solely
upon her status" 56 and not in retaliation for her acts. 57 Accordingly, the court
determined that the female employee now had adequate remedies for the sexual
harassment under Title VII that were not previously available in Tate. 5 8
Except as noted above, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has traditionally
limited the Burt public policy tort exception to a narrowly defined class of cases in
which the wrongful discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy as defined
by constitutional, statutory or case law, and there is no other available remedy to
the aggrieved employee.
V.

DECISION OF THE CASE

The Collier court answered the certified question in the affirmative, holding
that an employee subjected to "quid pro quo sexual harassment who has been
discharged - either explicitly or constructively - from employment, can
maintain a Burk-type claim for wrongful discharge" 159 since the OADA did not
provide "victims of sexual harassment the same remedy as that statutorily given to
handicap-discrimination victims."'1
VI. DICUSSION OF THE COURT'S REASONING
A.

ConstructiveDischargeand the Burk PublicPolicy Tort

The plaintiff argued that "a constructive retaliatory discharge is actionable
,,161
within the Burk tort's parameter ....
Recognizing that the constructive discharge doctrine had been previously
used "in conjunction with several Burk claims,"' 62 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
acknowledged that "Oklahoma's extant jurisprudence [had] never specifically
approved it as a basis for bringing the public-policy tort."'163 Furthermore, the
court stated: "Until now the Court has not been called upon to succinctly define
the criteria for determining when a constructive discharge has occurred and
152. Marshall,939 P.2d at 1119.
153. See id.

154. Id.
155. See id.
at 1120-22.
156. Id. at 1122.
157. See id.
158. See Marshall,939 P.2d at 1122.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Collier v. Insignia Fin. Group, 981 P.2d 321, 326-27 (OkIa. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 323.
Id.at 324.
Id.
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whether the same will suffice for purposes of the Burk exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine."' 64
The court began its analysis by revisiting Marshallwhere it "observed that a
constructive discharge occurs when an employer deliberately makes or allows the
employee's working conditions to become so intolerable that a reasonableperson
subject to them would resign."'5 The court acknowledged, however, that this
definition failed to "define the outside parameters
under which a constructive
6
discharge will support a Burk-type claim."'

In defining the parameters, the court drafted an "objective [test] which
assays the complained of employer's conduct through the eyes of a reasonable
person standing in the employee's shoe and applies to all constructive discharges
pressed under the Burk tort's guise."' 67 The test solely focuses on the "impact of
the employer's action, whether deliberate or not, upon a 'reasonable'
employee."' 16 The two-part test requires a trial court to ask "(1) whether the
employer either knew or should have known of the 'intolerable' work conditions
and (2) if the permitted conditions
were so intolerable that a reasonable person
169
subject to them would resign.
By creating such a test,
the court imposes upon the trial court the obligation to survey the totality of the
circumstances which allegedly prompted the constructive discharge, including (but
not limited to) the "frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it
is physically threatening or humiliating; or a mere offensive utterance;
and whether
170
it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.

In explaining the test, the court asserted that a constructive discharge can
occur and "may serve as a predicate for bringing a Burk-type claim"'17 if an
employer's
conduct is "so objectively offensive' ' 72 that it causes the employee to
3
quit.

B.

7

Quid Pro Quo Sexual HarassmentUnder the Burk PublicPolicy Tort

Additionally, the plaintiff argued that a "Burk claim may be pressed for a
wrongful discharge occasioned by quid pro quo sexual harassment"' 74 if state
statutory remedies are unavailable. 7 5
To determine whether quid pro quo sexual harassment was remediable

164. Id.
165. Collier,981 P.2d at 324 (footnote omitted).

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Collier,981 P.2d at 324.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 323.
See id
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under the Burk public policy tort, the court began its analysis in the OADA. 76
The court determined that Section 1302 of the OADA "clearly articulate[d] a
public policy which castigates sexual harassment in the workplace.,1 77 Section
1302 provides in pertinent part:
A. It is discriminatory practice for an employer:
1. To... dischargej] or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to
compensation or the terms, conditions, privileges or responsibilities of employment,

because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap ....
According to the court, this statute prohibited "conditioning continued
employment upon the grant of sexual favors requested of an employee by an
employer or supervisor-the essence of quid pro quo sexual harassment., 179 In
order to lay this foundation, the court rallied around Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson1t ° in which the United States Supreme Court recognized that "sexual
harassment-actionable under Title VII-occurs when employees 'are asked or
required to submit to sexual demands as a condition to obtain employment or to
maintain employment or to obtain promotions." '181 Therefore, the court
determined that an employer violated Oklahoma public policy, the first predicate
of the Burk public policy tort, if the discharged employee could prove quid pro
sexual harassment. 182
To assert the Burk public policy tort exception, however, the court had to
determine that the OADA lacked a statutory remedy for quid
pro quo sexual
3 If one existed, the employee had no Burk claim.1 4
harassment.l
The court began its reasoning at the heart of the OADA, its purpose.185
Title 25, section 1101(a) of the Oklahoma Statutes provides in pertinent part that:
[t]he general purposes of this act are to provide for execution within the state of the
policies embodied in the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and Section 504 of the federal
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to make uniform the law of those states which enact this
act, and to providerights and remedies substantiallyequivalent to those granted under

176. See id. at 324-25.
177. Collier, 981 P.2d at 324-25 (footnote omitted). It is worthy to note that the OADA defines
employer to mean "a person who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty
(20) or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year...." OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, §
1301(1) (1991). The requirement for fifteen (15) employees is identical to the number specified in Title
VII. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).

In Brown v. Ford, the Oklahoma Supreme Court acknowledged that such a statute "sought to avoid
imposing upon small shops the potentially disastrous expense of defending against a state-law claim for
workplace discrimination, whether based upon offending sexual conduct or on other grounds." 905
P.2d 223, 227 (Okla. 1995).

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Collier, 981 P.2d at 325 (footnote omitted) (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1302 (1991)).
Id.
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Collier, 981 P.2d at 325 n.11 (quoting Mentor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 68).
Id.
See Id.
See id.

185. See id.
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the federal FairHousing Law.18

Ascertaining the legislative intent from the language of this statute, 187 the
court reached the "conclusion that while the Legislature meant to incorporate the
policies of Title VII (among other federal acts), it intended that the [OADA's]
primary remedial scheme be that afforded by the Fair Housing Law. '' 18s Armed
with this language, the court found that "[t]his distinction explains the
dichotomous remedial treatment afforded victims under the [OADA] -victims of
housing discrimination may elect to pursue a civil cause of action under the terms
of 25 O.S.1991 §§ 1502.14 & 1502.15 while those suffering gender-based
harassment are provided only an administrative remedy."1 89 Based solely on the
Oklahoma Legislature's word choice, the court determined that the OADA
"drafters understood that policies and remedies are distinct since [the statute's]
language differentiates between the two."'19 Since the statutory language did not
purport the federal remedies to be the "exclusive remedies for violations of the
articulated anti-discriminatory policies,"1 91 the court did not interpret them to be

so. 92 Essentially, the Oklahoma Legislature drafted title 25, section 1101(a) in a
fashion that makes the statute subject to more than one interpretation. 193
Since the OADA is susceptible to multiple meanings, the court had to
interpret the statutory provision in a manner "which frees [the Act] from
constitutional infirmity.' 194

To make such an interpretation, the court, once again, returned to the Tate
decision. 195 There, the court held that "for remedial purposes, discrimination

186. Id. (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1101(a) (1991)). The Oklahoma legislature amended section
1101(a) of the OADA in 1991 by adding the following: "and to provide rights and remedies

substantially equivalent to those granted under the federal Fair Housing Law." OKLA. STAT. tit 25, §
1101(a) (1991). In the original version, the OADA contained only administrative remedies through
the Oklahoma Human Rights Commission. See Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1229
(Okla. 1992).
187. Collier, 981 P.2d at 325; see also Tate, 833 P.2d at 1228 ("To ascertain legislative intent we look

to the language of the pertinent statute. Statutory words are to be given their ordinary sense except
when a contrary intention plainly appears."); Hess v. Excise Bd. of McCurtain County, Okla., 698 P.2d
930, 932 (Okla. 1985) ("The goal of statutory construction is to follow the intent of the legislature.").
188. Collier,981 P.2d at 325.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192 See id. To reach this conclusion, the court relied on its reasoning in Tate. In regards to Title VII
claims, the Tate court declared that:
[S]tate laws will be preempted only if they actually conflict with federal law. The United
States Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions as explicit disclaimers of any federal
intent categorically to preempt state law or to 'occupy the field' of employment
discrimination. The Nation's highest court describes Title VII as a floor beneath which
federally provided protection may not drop rather than a ceiling above which it may not rise.
In short, states' remedies for relief from employment discrimination and for the
compensation of its victims may be both different from and broader that those provided by
Title VII.
Tate, 833 P.2d at 1222.
193. See Collier,981 P.2d at 325.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 325-26.
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victims [under the [OADA]] comprise a single class.

196

With this holding in

mind, the Collier court declared that "the [OADA] gives discharged victims of
handicap discrimination a private cause of action against the offending employer,
[yet] it only provides an administrative remedy for victims of quid pro quo sexual
harassment." 197 As a result of the two different remedies, the court stated, "[w]ere
we to hold that the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act provides the exclusive

remedial scheme for wrongful discharges which are the product of sexually
discriminatory practices, we would in effect be sanctioning unequal remedies for
members of the same class."' 9

Moreover, the court declared that such a holding

would violate Oklahoma's Constitution,'" which clearly prohibits "the passage of
special law which would authorize disparate remedies for like-situated
(employment-discrimination) victims." 2°° Therefore, the court "conclude[d] that
the Legislature did not intend the administrative remedy afforded to sexual-

discrimination victims by the [OADA] to be an exclusive remedy."''

1

196. Id. at 326 (quoting Tate, 833 P.2d at 1229-30). Note that the bracket comment was added by the
court in Collier,it is not found in the Tate decision.
197. 111 (footnote omitted). See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 1502.14, 1502.15, 1901 (1991). The
pertinent terms of title 25, section 1901(A) are:
If a charge for discrimination in employment on the basis of handicap is filed under the
provisions of Sections 1101 through 1801 of Title 25 of the Oklahoma Statutes and is not
resolved to the satisfaction of the charging party within one hundred eighty (180) days from
the filing of such charge, the charging party may commence an action for redress against any
person named as respondent in the charge ....
Id. § 1901(A). See also Atkinson v. Halliburton Co., 905 P.2d 772, 776 (Okla. 1995) (declaring that
Section 1901(A) of Title 25 "states clearly that an aggrieved person may resort to the courts for
redress").
Sections 1501 et seq. of title 25 of the Oklahoma Statutes define how a victim may remedy alleged
discrimination under the OADA. The OADA requires a victim to file a complaint with the Human
Rights Commission (the "Commission") within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory practice. See id.
§ 1502(A). If the Commission finds that an employer violated any provision of section 1302 under the
OADA, it may a) seek a temporary injunction or restraining order, b) require the complainant and
employer to engage in conciliation, or c) order the employer to stop engaging in unlawful
discrimination. See id.§§ 1502.1, 1502.6. A civil action is only available for violations involving
discriminatory housing practices or handicap discrimination. See id. §§ 1502.14, 1502.15, 1901.
198. Collier,981 P.2d at 326.
199. Section 46 of Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution states in pertinent part:
The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or
special law authorizing:
Regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in judicial
proceedings or inquiry before the courts... or other tribunals, or providing or changing the
methods for the collection of debts, or the enforcement of judgments or prescribing the
effect of judicial sales of real estate ....
OKLA. CONsT. art. V,

§ 46 (1907).

200. Collier, 981 P.2d at 326; see Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc. 833 P.2d 1218, 1230 ("Our
Constitution absolutely interdicts the passage of special law that would sanction disparate remedies for
those who complain of employment discrimination.").
201. Collier,981 P.2d at 326. The court makes this decision based on its reasoning found in Tate. See
Tate, 833 P.2d at 1225. The Tate court states: "[b]y statutory mandate the common law remains in full
force in this state, unless a statute explicitly provides to the contrary. Oklahoma law does not permit
legislative abrogation of the common law by implication; rather, its alteration must be clearly and
plainly expressed." Id.
Section 2 of title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides: "The common law, as modified by
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To resolve the issue, the court determined that the "administrative remedy
provided by the [OADA] to employees whose discharge is caused by quid pro quo
sexual harassment is cumulative of the common law Burk remedy., 202 The court
concluded that the Burk public policy tort provided a quid pro quo sexual
harassment victim with a comparable remedy statutorily provided under the
OADA to victims of handicap discrimination-a private cause of action in civil
court. 2°3 Under this "adopted construction of the [OADA] -i.e., that it does not
provide the exclusive remedy for quid pro quo sexual harassment which
culminates in wrongful discharge," 2 4 the court found that it "avoids the pitfall of
according asymmetrical remedies to members of a single class of employmentdiscrimination victims."
In summary, the Collier court held that quid pro quo sexual harassment
victims who were constructively or explicitly discharged from their employment
can assert a Burk public policy tort claim for wrongful discharge. 2 6 This claim
would not be available if the OADA "afforded victims of sexual harassment the
same remedy as that statutorily given to handicap-discrimination victims." 20 7
VII. EXTENDING THE BURK TORT TO PREGNANCY
DISCRIMINATION
A.

What about List?

Stare decisis2 leads one to believe that the Collier court would only allow a
Burk public policy tort "in a narrow class of cases in which the discharge is
contrary to a clear mandate of public policy as articulated by constitutional,

statutory or decisional law."''
Yet, the majority opinion in Collier failed to
reconcile its reasoning in light of all the decisions leading up to the case,
specifically the List decision.210

Returning briefly to List, the court there denied the employee an
opportunity to use the Burk public policy tort claim for two reasons. 211 First, the
court determined that the employee had adequate remedies not directly available

constitutional and statutory law, judicial decisions and the condition and wants of the people, shall
remain in force in aid of the general statutes of Oklahoma .... " OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2.
202. Collier, 981 P.2d at 326. In footnote 20, the Collier court rejected a prior notion found in
Marshall that tended to "supportg the conclusion that the Oklahoma Anit-Discrimination Act
provides an adequate remedy for quid pro quo sexual harassment .....

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.

See id.
lId
Id.
See Collier,981P.2d at 326.
Id.

208. The Latin word stare decisis means "to stand by things decided." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY

1414 (7th ed. 1999). This word represents "the doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a
court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise in litigation." Id.
209. Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24,28 (Okla. 1989).
210. See Collier, 981 P.2d at 321-27.

211. See discussion supraPart IV. C.
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under the OADA but rather through the ADEA.212 The List court, however, did
not separate the two acts when determining whether a remedy existed. The acts
were "interpreted together to discern what an employee's rights are under
[Oklahoma] law., 213 Second, the employee's claim was "not based on retaliation
for anything he did... [but rather] solely upon his status, his age. 214
Interestingly, the List court answered the certified question that was specifically
geared toward Oklahoma law in the negative (i.e., it did not address a possible
cause of action under federal law) 215 because the employee already had a cause of
action under federal law.216 Moreover, the List court held the federal remedy to
be exclusive. 7
In contrast to that in List, the Collier court did not interpret the OADA in
conjunction with Title VII, although it did mention that Title VII was imbedded in
the OADA purpose.1 8 Rather, the Collier court focused on the OADA alone.219
In doing so, the Collier court determined that the available remedies under the
OADA for a sexual harassment victim were inferior to those of a handicapdiscrimination victim. 220 The court ignored the fact that federal statutory
remedies 22' were available to Ms. Collier. 222 Specifically, Title VII provided Ms.
Collier the opportunity to "request a jury trial.., recover compensatory
and
22
3
expenses.
and
costs
fees,
attorneys'
with
along
damages
punitive
It is also noteworthy to mention that the Collier court abandoned yet
another facet of its reasoning in List, an argument provided by Professor Lex K.
Larson.224 In List, the court conveyed that it was inappropriate to "use [the]

212. See id.
213. List v. Anchor Paint Mfg. Co., 910 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Okla. 1996).

214. Id. at 1015.
215. See id. at 1012.,
216. See id. at 1013; see discussion supra Part IV. C.
217. See List, 910 P.2d at 1013, 1015; see discussion supra Part IV. C.

218. See Collier v. Insignia Fin. Group, 981 P.2d 321, 321-27 (Okla. 1999).
219. See id. at 324-326; see also discussion supraPart VI. B.
220. See Collier, 981 P.2d at 324-26.

221. In the Collier dissent, Justice Kauger listed the remedies available to Ms. Collier under Title
VII. See id. at 327 n.4, 328 nn.5-6. Title 42, section 1981a(a)(1) of the United States Code provides in

pertinent part:
In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000e-5, 2000e-16] against a respondent who engaged in unlawful
intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its
disparate impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act [42 U.S.C. 2000e-2,
2000e-3, 2000e-16], and provided that the complaining party cannot recover under section
1981 of this title, the complaining party may recover compensatoryand punitive damages as
allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by section
706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1991) (emphasis added). Title 42, section 1981a(c) of the United States Code
provides in pertinent part: "If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this
section-(1) any party may demand a trialby jury ....
Id. § 1981a(c) (emphasis added).

222. See Collier,981 P.2d at 329; see also supra note 221.
223. Collier,981 P.2d at 327-28.

224. Professor Lex K. Larson is the President of Employment Law Research, Inc. in Durham, North
Carolina.
Larson's Worker's Compensation Pages (visited
http://Nw.larsonpubs.com/aboutlex.html. Professor Larson specializes
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discrimination laws as a basis for any public policy exception to the at-will
termination rule."'
The List court quoted Professor Larson as follows:
The use of discrimination laws as the basis for public policy exception has the
potential to expand greatly the available remedies. Furthermore, because of this
expansion of remedies, it would seem that employees would be encouraged to
circumvent or ignore the very statutes on which the public policy exception is based.
Why should a discharged employee go to the trouble of filing a claim with a state
agency and/or the EEOC before bringing an action for back pay, when disregarding
those procedures may bring the possibility
of recovering not only lost wages but also
6
a healthy sum in punitive damages?.
In contrast to this reasoning, the Collier court declared that the OADA was
literally a state-declared public policy, the first predicate of the Burk public policy
tort claim.tm
Frankly, the Collier decision remains confusing and unpredictable as long as
the List decision remains intact. In footnote 20 of the Collier opinion, the court
overruled Marshall "to the extent that [it] can be read to support the conclusion
that the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act provides an adequate remedy for
quid pro quo sexual harassment; ,228 however, List was not even mentioned in the
majority opinion.229 In the meantime, the Collier decision will continue to have
potentially far-reaching effects.
B.

The Burk Public Policy Tort and PregnancyDiscrimination

While the Collier court declared that the "Burk tort encompasses a broader
range of wrongful discharges that [sic] just those involving one of proscribed
categories of discrimination articulated in Title VII or the Oklahoma AntiDiscrimination Act," 0 it did not intend to include pregnancy discrimination in
that category.
First, the OADA fails to articulate a public policy that reprimands
employers for pregnancy discrimination in the workplace.23I The statutory
language of the OADA only prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis
of "race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or handicap." 32 The proscribed
discrimination under the OADA does not include that based on pregnancy.
Moreover, the prohibition based on sex does not include pregnancy and, does not
reach the issue of pregnancy discrimination. Therefore, if a wrongfully terminated
employee is able to prove pregnancy discrimination, she still cannot assert that her
employment law such as worker's compensation law and employment discrimination. See id.
225. List v. Anchor Paint Mfg. Co., 910 P.2d 1011, 1015 (Okla. 1996).
226. Id.(quoting 1 LEx K. LARSON, UNJUST DIsMISSAL § 6.10[6][e], at 6-91 (1989)). Professor
Larson no longer maintains this section in his treatise. See 1 LEX K.

LARSON,

UNJUST DISMISSAL

§§

6.01 et seq. (2000).
227. See Collier,981 P.2d at 324-25; supra discussion Part VI. B.
228. Collier,981 P.2d at 326.
229. See iU' at 321-26.
230. Id. at 324.
231. See OKLA. STAT. tit 25, § 1308 (1991).
232. Id.
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employer violated a state-declared public policy under the OADA.
Next, the PDA is contained within the sex discrimination provisions of Title
VII.233 While the OADA expressly "provide[s] for execution within the state of
the policies embodied in [Title VII]," the provision does not create a statedeclared policy for the State of Oklahoma. Since Title VII provides an employee
wrongfully terminated for pregnancy with a private remedy, the Burk public
policy tort is unavailable to redress employees wrongfully terminated because of
pregnancy.
The narrowly defined Burk public policy tort exception to the common law
employment-at-will doctrine "only lies when an employer [1] violates [by wrongful
discharge a] public-policy goal[] ... clearly articulated in existing law... and
[2] ... there is no adequate, statutorily-expressed remedy."2 35 Since the OADA
fails to provide a clearly articulated, state-declared public policy and since
adequate remedies currently exist under Title VII, there can be no Burk tort for
those aggrieved by wrongful termination motivated by pregnancy discrimination.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Collier leaves us with many unanswered questions. Many may question
whether wrongfully-terminated employees alleging discrimination will be allowed
to pursue the Burk public policy tort even though an adequate federal remedy
exists. Do employees have to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing
a Burk tort claim? Can wrongfully-terminated employees completely circumvent
the federal statutes and ultimately recover uncapped compensatory and punitive
damages? Will Collier now affect small employers previously protected by the
OADA and Title VII?
The Oklahoma Supreme Court currently has before it yet another certified
question. 236 The question specifically involves whether the Collier court
conclusively determined that all forms of gender-based discrimination, including
pregnancy discrimination, were incorporated as public policy of the State of
Oklahoma to support a Burk-type tort. One hopes the answer will end the
confusion among the various jurisdictions regarding Collier and pregnancy
discrimination.2 37 Based on the analysis above, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
should rule that Collier does not extend the Burk public policy tort to victims of

233. See supra note 5.
234. OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1101.
235. Collier,981 P.2d at 323.
236. See Clinton v. State, No. CIV-99-937-L (W.D. Okla. 2000).
237. Compare Bates v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, No. CJ-97-2838 (Tulsa County Sept. 25, 1998), and
Lummus-Bentov. Image Sys. Int'l, Inc., No. CIV-98-1680-L (W.D. Okla. Dec. 10, 1998), with Coyle v.
Green Country Interiors, No. 99-CV-0690-H (N.D. Okla. Mar. 1,1999), and Clinton v. State, No. CIV99-937-L (W.D. Okla. 2000).
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pregnancy discrimination. Rather, those wrongfully terminated due to pregnancy
should look to the adequate federal remedies that already exist under Title VII.
Samuel E.Joyner
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